全文获取类型
收费全文 | 382篇 |
免费 | 72篇 |
国内免费 | 12篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 4篇 |
2022年 | 8篇 |
2021年 | 11篇 |
2020年 | 8篇 |
2019年 | 18篇 |
2018年 | 8篇 |
2017年 | 15篇 |
2016年 | 17篇 |
2015年 | 14篇 |
2014年 | 30篇 |
2013年 | 143篇 |
2012年 | 20篇 |
2011年 | 15篇 |
2010年 | 15篇 |
2009年 | 14篇 |
2008年 | 10篇 |
2007年 | 18篇 |
2006年 | 17篇 |
2005年 | 11篇 |
2004年 | 10篇 |
2003年 | 6篇 |
2002年 | 10篇 |
2001年 | 6篇 |
2000年 | 11篇 |
1999年 | 2篇 |
1998年 | 3篇 |
1997年 | 3篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1995年 | 3篇 |
1994年 | 5篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 2篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有466条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
51.
Paolo Foradori 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):13-29
Despite the fact that Italy hosts almost half of the remaining estimated 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) that are currently deployed in Europe, case studies of Italy have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill that gap by outlining the key elements of Italy's position regarding the presence, role, and future of TNW in Italy. By considering both the military and political-symbolic dimensions of TNW, the author argues that Italy has largely embraced the process of the devaluation of nuclear weapons; however, this is offset by the country's determination to preserve the principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security. By making the alliance's cohesion a priority, Italy appears willing to postpone the complete elimination of TNW from its territory if necessary; despite this, Italy otherwise considers TNW to be not only weapons of little intrinsic value but also obstacles to the global nuclear disarmament program that it strongly supports. 相似文献
52.
Derrin Culp 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):51-68
Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence, nobody—including nuclear weapons scholars—has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson's essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson's arguments—deficiencies that make his essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson's thesis could be correct. His arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. 相似文献
53.
George Michael 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):143-147
Ron Rosenbaum, How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III. Simon & Schuster, 2011. 305 pages, $28. 相似文献
54.
Patrick Disney 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):159-175
This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach. 相似文献
55.
The policies toward countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main threats to international security. This article maps the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using data from an expert survey, the authors outline four main findings. First, policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, no policy convergence was observed among the states studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for accommodation. Third, states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Finally, despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. The authors’ findings indicate that states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear aspirants. Although a comprehensive examination of the causes of these policy differences is beyond the scope of this article, the authors present evidence that a major cleavage exists between members and non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement, indicating that the degree to which nuclear aspirants’ sovereignty should be respected is a main issue of contention. 相似文献
56.
Douglas B. Shaw 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):357-363
The Middle East is a crucial region for the global nonproliferation regime. In 2010, the state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proposed a conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone. The nuclear weapon-free zone model, on which this idea builds, has achieved important results in other regions, but faces especially stark challenges in the Middle East. However, the attempt to apply the boldly imaginative zone approach to the Middle East holds promise for building a more inclusive dialogue on nonproliferation and regional security. 相似文献
57.
Leonard Weiss 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):269-284
The phenomenon of global warming has led to a revival of the prospects for increased nuclear energy production worldwide, yet such increased production carries with it the increased risk of proliferation. To mitigate this risk, various multinational arrangements have been proposed to provide reliable supply of nuclear fuel while at the same time discouraging the construction of national plants for nuclear enrichment and reprocessing. This article provides a brief history of some of these proposals and concludes that the likelihood of success for such schemes as effective tools for nonproliferation is not high at this time. A proposal from the World Council on Renewable Energy to expand the understanding of supplier obligations under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to include the development of non-nuclear energy technologies for NPT parties in good standing is potentially a much better nonproliferation tool. Such an approach tracks the ideas contained in Title V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, which has recently received revived congressional interest. 相似文献
58.
Anne Harrington de Santana 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):325-345
There are important similarities between the pattern of behavior Karl Marx identified with respect to commodities—a pattern he called “fetishism”—and the pattern of behavior identified in this article with respect to military force. Marx identified money as the mature expression of commodity fetishism; the author identifies nuclear weapons as the mature expression of the fetishism of force. As such, nuclear weapons function as the currency of power in the international system. This article lays out a theory of nuclear fetishism by adapting four themes that are characteristic of the pattern of behavior known as fetishism: materiality, historicality, efficacy, and reification. By applying these categories to the fetishism of nuclear weapons, the author shows that nuclear weapons represent a new social form consistent with, yet distinct from, other fetish objects. 相似文献
59.
Joshua Masters 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):347-361
As the potential for the involvement of corporations in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has increased, particularly through dual-use technology, global regulation has failed to keep pace. Where regulation of private corporations does exist, in the form of treaties, UN resolutions, or more informal arrangements, the obligations fall only on states. This state of affairs is a result of international law's traditional deference to state sovereignty; yet, it has led to significant shortcomings in the global regulatory regime, where states are unwilling or unable to meet their obligations. While radical departures from the traditional model of international law might remove the regulatory gaps caused by noncompliant states, such changes are unrealistic in the current political climate. More realistic changes must be focused on, offering greater recognition of the role of private corporations in nuclear proliferation and increasing state compliance with existing regulation. 相似文献
60.
Bryan R. Early 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):259-280
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has laid out an ambitious plan to become the first Arab country to possess a civilian nuclear energy program. Central to that effort has been the Emirati government's ability to obtain foreign nuclear assistance. This article traces the UAE's strategies for overcoming the obstacles that stood in the way of nuclear suppliers providing assistance. It examines the approach taken by the UAE to assuage the safety and security concerns of nuclear suppliers, how the UAE leveraged its alliances with France and the United States to obtain their cooperation, and its strategies for engaging domestic interest groups in supplier states. The generalizable elements of the UAE's strategies are discussed and used to provide insight into the prospects for other Middle Eastern states' bids to obtain similar assistance. The article concludes with a discussion of the potentially transformative aspects of the strategies employed by the UAE in shaping other countries' pursuit of nuclear energy in the region. 相似文献